We give an axiomatization of confidence transfer -a known conditioning scheme -from the perspective of expectation-based inference in the sense of Gardenfors and Makinson. Then, we use the notion of belief independence to "filter out" different proposals of possibilistic conditioning rules, all are variations of confidence transfer. Among the three rules that we consider, only Dempster's rule of conditioning passes the test of supporting the notion of belief independence. With the use of this conditioning rule, we then show that we can use local computation for computing desired conditional marginal possibilities of the joint possibility satisfying the given constraints. It turns out that our local computation scheme is already proposed by Shenoy. However, our intuitions are completely different from that of Shenoy. While Shenoy just defines a local computation scheme that fits his framework of valuation-based systems, we derive that local computation scheme from ll(�) = ll(� I o.) * ll(a) and appropriate independence assumptions, just like how the Bayesians derive their local computation scheme.
INTRODUCTION
The theory of possibility [Zadeh 78] formalizes a notion of belief that may be described as follows. Let fl be a finite, non-empty set of propositional primitives. Let Xp be the least set of formulas containing fl, closed under..., and " (with the usual abbreviations v and :::J ). Let El be the set of all interpretations of 'f. A possibility measure n is a function from the set of all propositions 2 El to the real interval [0, I] . n satisfies three conditions: 1 1 We write a to mean either a fonnula a or a set [a](� 8); [a] is the set of all models of a.
(i) ll{.l) = 0 I* it is impossible for any unsatisfiable proposition to be true */
(ii) ll(T) = I I* a tautology is never less than totally possible (i.e., always 1) */ (iii) ll(a v �) == max(ll(a), n (�)) I* the basic postulate of possibility *I
For any proposition a, 1 -ll(a) represents "my potential degree of surprise upon realizing that a is true" [Shackle 61; Hsia 91] . n is such that either ll(o.) = 1, or ll(-·-.o.)
= 1, or both, since max(II(o.), ll(-.o.)) = ll(a v -.a)= ll(T) = l. Therefore by equating "believe a" with 0(-.a) < I (meaning that ..., a is considered to be less possible, while a is considered to be totally possible), we see that the notion of belief here is that we do not believe in both o. and ..., a at the same time. This conforms to our everyday use of the word 'believe'.
From n. we can define its density junction Jt : e -[0, 1], where Jt{ro) = ll{{ro}). Jt is also known as a possibility distribution. It completely determines n. And so one other way of understanding possibility theory is to postulate the existence of a possibility distribution Jt on a. Jt is such that there is always a world (l) that is totally possible (:�t(ro) = 1), while n is induced by Jt in that ll(A) = max{Jt(m): ro E A}. This view of possibility theory has a close analogy with probability theory (just replace maximum by addition) : a probability distribution p is such that :E{p(ro): roE 9} == 1� moreover, P(A) = :E{p(c.o): c.o E A).
Over the years, there have been several suggestions concerning the "right" conditioning rule(s) to use in possibility theory. Two often-mentioned rules are, respectively, the minimum rule of conditioning (what Dubois and Prade [86, 91] use in their reasoning approach) and Dempster's ru1e of conditioning (the "official" conditioning rule that is used in the theory of belief function [Shafer 76; Smets 88] ). These two rules, together with a third but less-known rule due to Yager [87] , are all instances of a generic conditioning scheme called confidence transfer (also known as belief transfer [Smets 88]) . And so two questions are of interest. One, is there any reason why we should be interested in confidence transfer? Two, if we are to use one particular instance of confidence transfer as our "official" conditioning rule, which conditioning rule should we use?
In this paper, we seek to justify confidence transfer from a logic-based perspective. Specifically, we give an axiomatization from the standpoint of expectation-based inference in the sense of Giirdenfors and Makinson [94] . By strengthening a proposal for making belief revisions that is due to Rott [91] , we derive the notion of confidence transfer. To choose an appropriate instance of confidence transfer as our official rule of conditioning, we then use the notion of belief independence to "filter out" different proposals. Among the three rules of conditioning that we mentioned, only Dempster's rule passes the test of supporting the notion of belief independence. Though we cann ot rule out all possible alternatives (there are infinitely many of them), Dempster's rule does seem to be our only natural choice.
Other authors have also tried to justify some of the conditioning rules that we mentioned. Smets [93] , on the other hand, gives an explicit axiomatization of Dempster's rule of conditioning in a rather abstract setting (where he talks about all "reasonably defined" credibility functions). It is interesting to note that both of these two attempts are related to the Bayesian approach in some way. Equation (1), for example, originates directly from the probabilistic conditioning rule P(a" fl) = P(� I a) * P(a) [Risdal 78 ].
And even though Smets works on an abstract level, he nevertheless requires that if probabilities are used as credibility functions, then the general conditioning rule that he is trying to derive must reduce to a rule that preserves additivity. Thus, these authors more or less rely on the a priori existence of the Bayesian approach in order for their work to be fully meaningful. This is not the case here. What we need here is an a priori notion of belief independence, among others.
Suppose we do use Dempster's rule of conditioning as our official rule of conditioning, we can then use the so-called "causal net" technique [Pearl 88 ] for modular specifications, and use local computation for computing conditional marginal possibilities. As it turns out, our local computation scheme is already described in Shenoy [92] . However, the underlying intuitions are completely different. Shenoy [89] builds his framework of valuation based systems on top of the three axioms of local computation proposed by Shenoy and Shafer [90] . Then he just defines a local computation scheme for possibility 2Dubois and Pr ade [86. 88 ] also used what they call the principle of minimum specificity in their justification. Co is the mathematical dual of n, and the relation is that
Since ( 
(II)
We remark that (II) actually should be written as "if
Co( -.a)< 1 then (I I)", since the prerequisite for (II) is that f U {a} is consistent (which is translated into Co(..., a) < 1). However, our axiomatization will be such that Co(.la) is undefined when Co(-. a)= 1. And so to facilitate our discussions, we leave (II) as it is. Lemma 2 .1 below shows that (III) is a reformulation of (II).
Co(y I a)> 0 iff Co( a ::> y) > Co(..., a).
>Co(-. a) and 1-aA� ::> y.
Proof: (=>)just let � be a ::> y.
(<=)Let � be such that Co(�)> Co(-.a) and I-aA� :J y. 1-� ::> (a ::> y). And so Co( a ::> y) �Co(�)> Co(-.a).
0
Thus by Rott's proposal, to see whether y ought to be expected when the given information is a, we just see if our (original) expectation of a :J y is higher than our expectation of .... a. But still, nothing is said about the new ordering among those newly expected propositions.
In particular, how should we order �a ndy if Co( a :J �) = Co( a :J y), and how should we order � andy if Co( a :J �) > Co(a ::> y)? Below, (D2) states that when the context is a, the difference in our (new) expectations of f3
andy should at least match the difference in our (original) expectations of a::> � and a ::> y. And so (III), i.e., Rott's proposal, is a logical consequence of (D2).
(D2) only defines the relative differences among the new expectations. Below, (D3) states that if we ever want to decrease our expectation of � when the context is a, we should not be overdoing it. After all, it is -.a that we use as the "threshold" for determining new expectations in the first place. And so the decrease should not be more than Co(--.a), our original expectation of .... a. give its definition in terms of possibilities so as to facilitate our discussion in the next sections.
Confidence transfer (the algorithm). Let IT be a possibility measure over 261. If IT(a) ;;t-. 0 (i.e., a is not considered impossible), then :rt(.la), the density function of IT(.Ia), can be computed using the following algorithm.
( 1 ) If w fi.
[a], then :rt( wla) is assigned 0. Finally, V c.o E A i • :rt(wla) is assigned the value :rt(w) + c1 + cz + ... + q.
Note that in the algorithm of confidence transfer, there is a parameter -a normalization rule -that still needs to be specified. Depending on what this rule is, different conditioning rules can result. Theorem 2.2 summarizes the above discussion. Suppose TI(a) � 0. Then the set of possibility measures IT( .Ia) defined by (Dl) -(D3) is the same as the set of possibility measures that are obtained from IT and a using the algorithm of confidence transfer.
BELIEF INDEPENDENCE AND DEMPSTER'S RULE OF CONDITIONING
Consider again the algorithm of confidence transfer described at the end of the last section. Suppose we use a normalization rule that assigns l -IT( a) to c 1 and O's to c 2 , ... , and Cn· Then this is the conditioning rule that Yager [87] proposed. If, on the other hand, we let Cn be 1 -IT( a) and q . ... , and C n -1 be 0, then this is essentially the minimum rule of conditioning that Dubois and Prade In order to choose among all these different proposals for the normalization rule, we use the notion of belief independence. The idea is as follows. Suppose a and 13 are two propositions that are judged to be independent of each other. Then whatever we learn about a (alternatively, �). it should not have any effect on our opinion about � (alternatively, a). Any conditioning rule that we use should allow us to express this intuition. To facilitate the proofs, let us consider the case in which both a and 13 are expected; none of the expectations are total, and the expectations are different. In other words,
Now, if our conditioning rule is the minimum rule of conditioning, then there is no possibility measure IT that satisfies the above constraints. Let us prove by contradiction. Suppose there is such a measure IT. Then IT(-.al -.13) = IT(-.a) � 1 (by the constraints). B ut IT(-.a 1-.13 ) = IT(-.aA-.13 1-.13). And so IT(-.a 1-.�) = 5 The only difference is that, when using their minimum rule, ll(.la) is defined (to be 1) when ll(a) = 0.
IT(-.aA-.13 1-.fl) = IT(-.aA-.13) (since the minimum rule is such that IT(..., a A..., � I ..., fl) is either IT(..., aA -.13) or 1). This implies that IT(-. a) = IT(..., a A..., �). And so IT( -.13) = IT(-.fl v (-.aA-.fl))=max(IT(-.j3), IT(-.aA-.�)) = max(IT( -.j3 ), IT(..., a)), which contradicts our assumption that IT(-.13) < IT(-.a).
Similarly, if our conditioning rule is what Yager [87] proposed, then there is no possibility measure IT that satisfies the above constrai nts either. Agai n we prove by contradiction. Suppose there is such a measure IT. Then Contrasting to these two rules, a unique solution exists if the rule we use is Dempster's rule of conditioning. Let a 1, a2, ... , a n be n mutually exclusive formulas (i.e., exactly one of the a i 's is true), and let 13 t , 132 · ... , � m be m mutually exclusive formulas. Suppose that 'tf i (1 s: is: n), 'tf j (1 s: is: m), IT(Uj) and IT(fl j ) are given. Also suppose that 'tf i, IT(Uj) = IT(Uj 1 13). where 13 is any formula that is built up from the Jl j 's using the logical connectives and IT(�)� 0, and that 'tf j, IT(fl j ) = ll(� j I a), where a is any formula that is built up from the Uj'S using the logical connectives and IT(a) � 0. ("I" is Dempster's rule of conditioning.) Then IT is that 'tf i,j, IT(Uj A fl j ) = IT(Uj) * IT(�j), where * is the usual multiplication operation. Next, we show that IT is a solution, where IT is such that 'tf i,j, IT(Uj A l3 j ) = IT(Uj)*ll(j3 j )-Without loss of generality,let us assume that 1 = IT(a 1 ) > IT(a2) > ... > IT( a n ) (just put those with the same possibility into one set). It suffices to just consider conditioning IT on a, where a is any formula that is built up from the Uj's using the logical connectives and IT( a)� 0. {[a i A fl j l : 1 s: is: n, 1 s:j s: m}, a partition of 8, can be viewed as a matrix with n rows and m columns; each row represents an Uj; each column represents a fl j ; and each entry <i,j> represents the proposition C1j A l3 j -[a] then consists of several rows of this matrix. Let the ordinal numbers of these rows be .sQ. (e.g., if .sQ. = {1, 3, 7}, then [a] consists of the first, third, and seventh row of the matrix; clearly, .sQ. C { 1, 2 , ... , n} ), and let k be the smallest element of .sQ.. II( a)= II(ak). And so V j (1 sj s m), II(� j I a)= max{II( Uj" � j I a) :
Clearly, Dempster's rule is the only one that is acceptable among the three rules that we considered. Also, it seems that no other natural normalization rule can be used in order that the notion of belief independence is supported (for example, it can be shown that Theorem 3.1 does not hold if the conditioning rule we use distributes the normalization constant evenly among the q's). However, we cannot rule out all other normalization rules. Because we are talking about all "arbitrary but fixed rules" here. And so we can only say that Dempster's rule is the only natural variation of confidence transfer that is known to be "qualified" in supporting the notion of belief independence.
POSSIBILISTIC PROPAGATION
Suppose we do use Dempster's rule as our official rule of conditioning, then we can use the so-called "causal net" technique [Pearl 88 ] for modular specifications, and use local computation to compute conditional marginal possibilities from the joint possibility satisfying the given constraints. It turns out that the propagation scheme that we use is already described in Shenoy [9 2 ]. However, as we have pointed out in Section 1, our intuition is completely different from that of Shenoy [92] . For us, it is not just a local computation scheme that we want. There has to be a firm semantic basis underlying this computation scheme, so that we know how to use it (correctly) for reasoning. For this reason, we think it is worthwhile to describe our reasoning approach in its entirety, and not just part of it. This is what we do in this section. Below, we just give an informal illustration. The interested reader should consult [Pearl 88 ] for aspects of modular specifications and [Pearl 86; Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter 88; Shenoy 89, 9 2 , 94; Shenoy and Shafer 90] for aspects of local computation.
The technique of modular specification starts with the specification of a directed acyclic graph G. Take Figure  4 .1 as an example. It specifies what we think about the causal relations among a (possible) earth quake, a (possible) burglary into our house, the (possible) sound of an alarm in our house, (possible) radio ann ouncements of the earth quake, and (possible) phone calls (informing us of the alarm) from our two neighbors Watson and Gibbon. Each node of G represents a propositional primitive P, and contains two values T and F (representing two possible truth values of P). If (P 1 • Q), (P 2 , Q) , ... , (P n • Q) are all Possibilistic Conditioning and Propagation 341 the edges that point to Q in G, then it means that our judgment of the truth or falsity of Q is fixed once the truth values of P 1, P 2· ... , and P n are known (independent of what the truth values of other primitives are). If a node P has no edge pointing to it (i.e., Pi s a "root node"), then it means that our judgment of P (a "prior") can be assessed directly without knowing the value of any primitive. To specify a possibility measure II, we just specify the priors and conditionals. That is, for each "root node" P, we specify IT(P) and IT(.., P); and if (P 1 , Q), (P 2 , Q), .. . , (P n , Q) are all the edges of G that point to Q, then we specify IT(Qia) and IT( -.Qia) for every formula a of the form L1 A L2 A ... A Lu. where 4 (1 sis n) is either P i or ..,p i · In terms of the above example, our specification (We need not specify a value for. e.g., II(AI B A E ); its value has to be 1, because ll(-.AI B �t. E ) is less than 1.) Note that here, our priors for B and Ejust say that "everything is possible".
Given the above sample specification, we can compute the possibility of Ls"LE"L A "LR 11L w "La <L B is either B or .., B, LE is either E or .., E. etc.) using a formula ((IV) below) that is derivable from the independence assumptions we made in specifying the graph.
With formulas like (IV), we can compute, in theory at least, II( {ro}) for all ro (i.e., Ls"LE"L A "LR 11Lw �t.l.a). that if two nodes u and v contain the same primitive P, then P is in every node on the path between u and v. In general, it may be the case that the groups of primitives involved cannot be arranged in a tree with the Markov property. When that happens, some additional groups of primitives will have to be added [Shenoy and Shenoy 90] . We are also allowed to add new groups of primitives as desired, so long as the Markov property is preserved. Originally, we specified some TI-values for each group of primitives. Now let us translate each of these _n specifications into what is called a potential, and assoctate each potential with its corresponding node on the tree.
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In this translation, TI(AIBAE), for example, becomes the potential-value of the valuation (of {B, E, A}) BAEAA, while II(-.B). for example, becomes the potential-value of the valuation -. B. If there were any additionally introduced group of primitives, then each valuation of these primitives would be assigned a potential-value of 1.
We now need to give an informal introduction of the notion of combination and marginalization. Let g, hand k be the sets of primitives {B, E, A}. {B. E}. and {B, E, R}, respectively. If G is a potential on {B, E, A}, then G h , the marginal of G for {B, E}, is such that 
, then we say that G and K are not combinable.
Local computation is essentially a process of marginalizing and combining potentials in a node by node fashion. For illustrative purposes, we just describe a one sweep process that (only) computes TI (BIWAR) and II( -.BIW .-.R). First, we attach two additional nodes {W} and {R} to the Markov tree in Figure 4 .2. Each of these two nodes is linked to a superset node (here we have no choice but to link {W} to {A, W}, and {R} to {E, R}), and is needed for input or output purposes. The potential on {W} is such that F is assigned 0 and T is assigned 1. The potential on {R} is the same. Let us designate the node {B} as the root of the tree. When the computation starts, each leaf just makes its potential "available" to its parent. Then, every internal node does the following: it waits until all its children have made their potentials available to it, and then it combines these potentials with its own potential, and makes the resulting potential available to its own parent if there is one. When the whole process finishes, TI(BIWt.R) and TI(-.BIW t.R) are just the potential on {B} normalized, i.e., we divide the potential-values of Band -.B by their maximum. Shenoy [92] has shown that the above described local computation scheme satisfies the three axioms of Shenoy and Shafer [90] . This, together with formulas such as (IV), imply that the scheme correctly computes the desired conditional marginals of the joint possibility satisfying the given constraints (i.e., the modular specification).
CONCLUSION
We have shown that the notion of confidence transfer can be justified from a logic-based perspective, and we do so by giving an axiomatization of confidence transfer. Our axiomatization is basically a strengthening of Rott's proposal [Ron 91], which was originally intended to be used in the area of theory of belief revision.
We also suggested that Dempster's rule of conditioning �s the only natural variation of confidence transfer that 1s known to support the notion of belief independence. It remains to be shown, however, that Dempster's rule is the only variation of confidence transfer that supports the notion of belief independence (in the sense of Theorem 3.1).
One might question the intuitive legitimacy of our approach. After all, it is quite obvious that some other criteria could have been used in choosing among different proposals of conditioning rules. Why must we use the notion of belief independence? Moreover, our definition of conditional independence seems to have a strong probabilistic flavor. Is this a hint then that our version of possibility theory is perhaps just some transformation of probability theory? Our answer to these questions is as follows. To start with, we think that belief independence is an a priori notion. After all, there are things in the world that are independent of each other, conditionally or otherwise. As such, our opinions of these "things " ought to be independent. And so, as long as we take the no�on of conditioning for granted, we should also take the notton of belief independence seriousl y. As for the definition of belief independence, it is just a matter of formulating our intuitive notion of belief independence in terms of our formal, generally accepted defmition of conditioni ng. It is true that our definition of belief independence looks just like the one in probability theory. But thi s should be interpreted to mean that we are on the right track (is there any other way of formulating our intuitive notion of belief independence?), and not that our theory is some transformation of probability theory. It is true that the "formal structure" of our version of possibility theory resembles that of probability theory . But "similar" is by no means "equal ", and it is important to note that these two theories have completely opposite notions of belief.
We also showed that if Dempster's rul e is used as the "official" rule of conditioning, then we can use the so called causal net technique to make modular specifications, and also use local computation to compute the desired conditional marginals of the underlying joint possibility. Our technique of modular specification is not new, nor is our technique of local computation. But we are the first to integrate these two techniques into possibility theory, using Dempster's rul e of conditioning as the glue.
